When Somalia’s Provisional Constitution was adopted in August 2012, it set an ambitious four-year agenda: complete federalization, review and ratify the constitution by referendum, and hold the country’s first direct elections since 1969, all while still fighting for territorial control against armed insurgent groups. Four years on, most of that agenda remained unfinished.

In this 2016 assessment, prepared for the Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law, Edmond Efendija, who worked on Somalia’s constitutional process since 2007, including with the IFCC and Committee of Experts, traces why implementation stalled: a constitution many Somali leaders never fully owned, an underfunded and delayed review commission, a federalization process that produced new states resembling miniature versions of the central government, and a Constitutional Court that was never established at all.

The paper remains a valuable reference point for understanding the institutional gaps, the Boundaries and Federation Commission’s paralysis, the unresolved status of Mogadishu, the contested 4.5 power-sharing formula, that Somalia’s subsequent constitutional reforms, culminating in the March 2026 Revised Federal Constitution, have had to grapple with.